Brandl v. City of Madison

Printer-friendly versionPrinter-friendly versionPDF versionPDF version

Brandl v. City of Madison

Case Number
S-14-1095
Call Date
November 5, 2016
Court Number
Madison
Case Summary

S-14-1095 Frances Brandl (Appellant) v. City of Madison

Madison County District Court, Judge Mark A. Johnson

Attorneys: Thomas H. DeLay (Stratton, DeLay, Doele, Carlson & Buettner, P.C., L.L.O.) (Appellant) --- Steven D. Davidson (Baird Holm LLP)

Civil: Breach of contract

Proceedings below: The district court affirmed the City Council's decision denying the contract claim and concluded that any claim for breach of contract arising from acts occurring prior to June 21, 2013, was time barred by Neb. Rev. Stat ' 17-704. Appellant filed a Petition to Bypass the Court of Appeals which was granted by the Nebraska Supreme Court.

Issues: The district court erred in 1) finding that the facts found by the tribunal were sufficient to deny Appellant's claim, 2) failing to find any facts or relevant evidence from the testimony and exhibits included in the transcript upon which it could find: (a) that the decision of the tribunal was supported by sufficient relevant evidence, or (b) that the facts were sufficient as a matter of law to support the tribunal's denial of Appellant's claim, 3) basing its decision on speculation from conclusions of fact and law rather than a finding of relevant evidence in support of the tribunal's decision, 4) refusing to include in its review of evidence in the transcript any evidence of substandard services, and complaints of the same offered by the Appellant of the Appellee's performance of the Admission Agreement occurring prior to June 21, 2013, but failing to exclude whatever evidence was offered by the Appellee of its performance of the Admission Agreement occurring during the same time frame, 5) finding that the facts found by the tribunal were sufficient to support the denial of Appellant's claim, when in fact the tribunal found no facts in support of its denial of Appellant's claim, 6) finding that each act of abuse, neglect, or personal indignity were part of a series of material breaches of the entire Admission Agreement, and unless claim was made within 90 days of each such act, claims made on the same were barred by the 90 day statute of limitations, 7) failing to find that the series of substandard services provided by Countryside during the year prior to June 21, 2013 only became material to a breach of the entire Admission Agreement by Countryside when accompanied or followed by repudiation of the service contract on June 25, 2013, 8) refusing to take judicial notice of the applicable foreign and state laws which were included by reference and description in the Admission Agreement; included by Code of Federal Regulations section number, and description in the evidence, and which defined the rights of Frances, and duties and standards of care of the nursing home under the Admission Agreement, 9) accepting evidence it found speculative, and conclusions of fact and law as the supporting relevant evidence for the decision of the tribunal.