Summary:
This is appeal from the Custer County Court sitting as a juvenile court. Crystal L. appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to three of her children, Madison, Conrad, and Austin. The Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the juvenile court terminating Crystal’s parental rights.
A juvenile petition was filed alleging that Madison, Conrad, and Austin lacked proper parental care by reason of the faults or habits of their mother Crystal. No allegations were made against the fathers of the children. It was alleged that Crystal went to a bar and left her children home alone. Austin, the oldest child, was 14 years old at the time and had an autism diagnosis. Law enforcement conducted a welfare check of the children at Crystal’s home 2 days later. Crystal admitted to law enforcement that she relapsed on methamphetamine and had plans to go to inpatient treatment in Arizona the next day. A contested adjudication hearing was held and the juvenile court adjudicated Madison, Conrad, and Austin as being within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a). Austin was placed with his great aunt, Madison was placed with her father, and Conrad was placed with his father.
During the review stages of the case, Crystal filed a motion for bridge order in both Madison’s case and Conrad’s case. Crystal alleged that Madison and Conrad had been placed with their respective fathers and that the juvenile court action could be safely closed once orders for custody, physical care, and visitation had been entered by the district court. Crystal requested that the juvenile court enter an order granting her and each child’s respective father joint legal and physical custody of their child, subject to a parenting plan. Conrad’s father objected to a bridge order being entered. Additionally, the GAL filed objections to Crystal’s motion for a bridge order for both children.
Shortly after Crystal filed a motion for a bridge order, the State and the children’s GAL jointly filed motions to terminate Crystal’s parental rights to Madison, Conrad, and Austin pursuant to § 43-292(2), (3), (4), (6), (7), and (9). A consolidated permanency and review hearing, hearing on the motion for bridge order, and hearing on the motion to terminate Crystal’s parental rights was held. The juvenile court considered each of the statutory grounds for termination alleged by the State and the GAL and found that statutory grounds for termination had not been proved pursuant to § 43-292(3) or (9). However, the court found by clear and convincing evidence that statutory grounds for termination existed pursuant to § 43-292(2), (4), (6), and (7) and that termination of Crystal’s parental rights was in the children’s best interests. In finding that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Crystal’s parental rights, the juvenile court also found that bridge orders were not in Madison’s or Conrad’s best interests. Accordingly, the court denied the motions for bridge orders.
Crystal assigns that the juvenile court erred (1) at the permanency hearing by not finding that a termination of parental rights motion was going to be filed and instead leaving the goal as family preservation/reunification, (2) in finding that statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights, and (3) in finding that she was unfit and that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests.
Crystal contends that she did not receive notice that a motion to terminate her parental rights was going to be filed prior to it actually being filed. She claims that there was not a timely permanency hearing and that there was no indication the matter was going to be referred for a termination. Despite her claim to the contrary, the Court of Appeals found that Crystal was provided adequate notice of the termination of parental rights proceedings. 43-291 provides:
After a petition, a supplemental petition, or motion has been filed, the court shall cause to be endorsed on the summons and notice that the proceeding is one to terminate parental rights, shall set the time and place for the hearing, and shall cause summons and notice, with a copy of the petition, supplemental petition, or motion attached, to be given in the same manner as required in other cases before the juvenile court.
Crystal did not contend that the procedure set forth in § 43-291 was not followed. Accordingly, she was given appropriate notice of the termination proceeding.
Next, the Court of Appeals turned to the statutory bases alleged in the termination of parental rights proceeding. § 43-292(7) allows for termination when “the juvenile has been in an out-of-home placement for fifteen or more months of the most recent twenty-two months.” By the plain and ordinary meaning of the language in § 43-292(7), there are no exceptions to the condition of 15 out of 22 months’ out-of-home placement. 43-292(7) operates mechanically and, unlike the other subsections of the statute, does not require the State to adduce evidence of any specific fault on the part of a parent. In other words, if the 15-out-of-22 formula is met, § 43-292(7) is met. The Court of Appeals concluded that the State showed clearly and convincingly that § 43-292(7) exists as a statutory basis for termination in this case. And since any one of the bases for termination codified in § 43-292 can serve as the basis for termination, the Court of Appeals concluded it need not consider the sufficiency of the evidence concerning the other statutory bases for termination.
The Court of Appeals next considered whether termination was in the children’s best interests. Under § 43-292, once the State shows that statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exist, the State must then show that termination is in the best interests of the child. The presumption that a child’s best interests are served by having a relationship with his or her parent is only overcome when the State has proven that the parent is unfit. The best interest analysis and a parental fitness analysis are separate inquiries, but each examines essentially the same underlying facts. Parental unfitness means a personal deficiency or incapacity which has prevented, or will probably prevent, performance of a reasonable parental obligation in child rearing and which has caused, or probably will result in, detriment to a child’s well-being. The Court of Appeals recounted the evidence presented at the termination hearing, including Crystal’s history with DHHS which went back to 2007. The Court concluded that the State rebutted the presumption of parental fitness as to Crystal. The Court of Appeals further found there was clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children’s best interests to terminate Crystal’s parental rights.
The Court of Appeals then turned to the issue of Crystal’s motion for a bridge order, as Crystal argued that a bridge order, rather than a termination of parental rights was in Madison’s and Conrad’s best interests. The juvenile court concluded that a bridge order would not be in the best interests of Madison and Conrad, citing § 43-246.02, which outlines the criteria necessary for a juvenile court to enter a bridge order. Section 43-246.02 provides in part:
A juvenile court may terminate its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 by transferring jurisdiction over the juvenile’s custody, physical care, and visitation to the district court through a bridge order, if all of the following criteria are met:
(a) The juvenile has been adjudicated under subdivision (3)(a) of section 43-247 in an active juvenile court case and a dispositional order in that case is in place;
(b) Paternity of the juvenile has been legally established . . . ;
(c) The juvenile has been safely placed by the juvenile court with a legal parent; and
(d) The juvenile court has determined that its jurisdiction under subdivision (3)(a) of
section 43-247 should properly end once orders for custody, physical care, and
visitation are entered by the district court.
In declining to enter a bridge order, the juvenile court specifically found that § 43-246.02(1)(d) had not been met. Further, the juvenile court was not ready to award custody to the children’s fathers by deeming them fit to safely care for them and thereby close the juvenile cases. The Court of Appeals agreed that based upon the finding that § 43-246.02(1)(d) had not been met, the juvenile court was unable to conclude that its jurisdiction over Madison and Conrad should end. Additionally, the Court of Appeals agreed that while placement of Madison and Conrad with their respective fathers may have been the best alternative while these cases have been pending, the record was not sufficient to conclude that the children’s fathers should be awarded permanent custody, at least at this time. In the Court of Appeal’s de novo review of the record, it agreed with the juvenile court that it would not be in Madison’s and Conrad’s best interests to terminate the court’s jurisdiction over them by entering bridge orders granting their custody to their respective fathers. Doing so would remove the children from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction where it was in a better position to determine what next steps were necessary to advance the best interests of these children.
For the reasons stated above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the order of the juvenile court terminating Crystal’s parental rights to Madison, Conrad, and Austin.